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I.  Introduction    
 Responses to the problem of evil are attempts to show that the existence of evil is 
consistent with the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God.  Theodicy 
responses are attempts to justify the ways of God before humankind; the main claim behind most 
theodicies is that God has an overriding reason to allow certain types and/or certain amounts of 
evil, and that this reason, if properly understood, shows that it is not morally wrong for God to 
allow evil.  I wish to claim that theodicies of a particular class (what I shall call ‘greater good’ 
theodicies, hereafter referred to as ‘FTGG’ theodicies), if made in the Christian tradition to 
establish that the existence of evil is consistent with the existence of a ‘3-O’ God must fail.  If 
FTGG theodicies have it right, then God allows some people to suffer in order to bring some 
other good about (the popular choices are moral sympathy, moral empathy, courage, and the 
like); if this is the case, then it also seems as though at least some of the people who suffer are 
allowed to suffer to produce goods for others.  If this is the case, I shall argue that the people God 
allows to suffer to produce goods for others are not being treated as ends in themselves, but rather 
as means to an end.  Thus, FTGG theodicists are in the position of claiming that God does not 
respect individual persons. 
 Two things to note before I proceed: 1) I wish to make no claims regarding the existence 
of God.  My only purpose is to show that FTGG theodicies are inconsistent with Christian 
tradition and with respect for persons, and thus fail even from a theistic perspective on those 
grounds.  2) I will limit my discussion only to a certain class of theodicies; namely, those which 
 65 
claim that God allows suffering such that greater good results, and that this fact shows that the 
existence of evil is consistent with the existence of an omnibenevolent God. 
 To these ends, I will first briefly specify what I take the problem of evil to be.  I will then 
briefly explain FTGG-type theodicies. Finally, I will present my argument as to why such 
theodicies must fail, and consider some possible responses to my argument. 
II.  The Problem of Evil.   
 There are at least two ways to understand the problem of evil.  The so-called ‘logical’ 
problem of evil arises when we consider the consistency of the following claims, which I will call 
set A: 
A: 1)  God is omniscient. 
 2)  God is omnipotent. 
 3)  God is omnibenevolent. 
 4)  Evil exists. 
Some explanation is, perhaps, needed here.  A1) above is often (although not always) taken to 
mean that God knows all true propositions past, present and future; A2) above is often taken to 
mean that God can do anything that is logically (or metaphysically1) possible; A3) above is 
normally taken to mean that God never does anything that is morally wrong.   
 A4) above is also possibly in need of elucidation.  I will take ‘evil’ for the remainder of 
this paper to include (although possibly not be limited to) suffering, either emotional or physical, 
either as the result of the activities of moral agents (‘moral’ evil) or of natural phenomena 
(‘natural’ evil).  It is A4) above that generates a possible contradiction.  That is, of the four 
propositions in set A, on the logical statement of the problem of evil, only three of them can be 
                                                            
1 This view is held by Peter Van Inwagen. 
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true at the same time.  If God is omniscient, then God would presumably know how to prevent 
evil.  If God is omnipotent, then God would be able to prevent evil; if God is omnibenevolent, 
then God would have reason to prevent evil.  Yet evil exists.  So, God must not be omnipotent, 
omniscient, and omnibenevolent (i.e., is eithr not omniscient, not omnipotent, or not 
omnibenevolent). 
 A second way to characterize the problem of evil is sometimes known as the ‘evidential’ 
problem of evil.  Once one has granted that it is plausible to claim that God allows evil in order to 
promote some greater good or to prevent a greater evil, the question may arise: what if the evil 
people suffer under is disproportionate to the amount f good produced?  If there is too much evil 
(or more evil than is necessary), then God still permits (some) evil to no good end, and we are 
arguably back to the ‘logical’ problem of evil. 
 I must confess that the question about the existence of gratuitous evil holds no interest for 
me23; neither is the amount of evil God allows germane to the argument I wish to give in my 
critique of FTGG theodicies.  If I am right, then FTGG theodicies contain a fundamental flaw to 
which the amount of evil occurring is simply not relevant. 
III.  FTGG Theodicies. 
 Theodicy responses to the problem of evil can take a number of different forms.  One 
type of theodicy is the attempt to show that evil is the result of the free will granted by God to 
humans and other beings (e.g., angels, demons, etc.). The claim here is that the possession of free 
will is of great value, and so God has a morally sufficient reason for not preventing evils that are 




3 I think that the question of gratuitous evil is fundamentally unanswerable for humans; I am quite content 
to claim that we are not in an epistemic position (and may not be able to get there) that is appropriate to 
judge the question of the existence of gratuitous evil. 
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less friendly to the major theistic religions; some have argued that God must necessarily be 
limited (i.e., God either has limited knowledge, limited power, or is not entirely good); others 
have argued that all evil is the result of (not necessarily human) free will4.  However, for the 
purposes of this paper, the type of response in whch I am most interested is the ‘for the greater 
good’-type response.  Theodicists of this type wish to claim, roughly, that God has some 
overriding reason to allow the existence of evil, showing that the propositions in set A are not 
inconsistent; this takes the form of claiming that God allows at least some evil in order to either 
produce some greater good or to prevent a greater vil.  The resulting principle would be 
something like 
 G2:  God legitimately allows some evil E iff either a) the occurrence 
of E is necessary for the production of some good G, and the advantages of 
G are greater than the disadvantages of E, or b) the occurrence of E is 
necessary for the prevention of some vil E’, and the disadvantages of E are 
not as great as the disadvantages of E’. 
 
 One of the more influential examples of what I take to be an FTGG theodicy is offered by 
John Hick.5  Hick starts from a view of humans in the Irenaean tradition: 
Instead of regarding man as having been created by God in a finished state, as a 
finitely perfect being fulfilling the divine intention for our human level of 
existence, and then falling disastrously away from this, the minority report [i.e., 
the Irenaean tradition] sees man as still in process of creation…. (Brackets 
added.) 
 
His view was that man as a personal and moral being already exists in the image, 
but has not yet been formed into the finite likeness of God.  By this “likeness” 
Irenaeus means something more than personal existence as such; he means a 
certain valuable quality of personal life whic reflects finitely divine life.  This 
represents the perfecting of man, the fulfillment of God’s purpose for humanity, 
                                                            
4 Alvin Plantinga seems to support this view. 
 
5 The following discussion is taken from Hick’s Evil and the God of Love, Harper & Rowe, 1977, pp. 253-
261, reprinted in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, 3rd edition, Louis Pojman, ed. Wadsworth 1998. 
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the “bringing of many sons to glory”, the creating of “children of God” who are 
“fellow heirs with Christ” of his glory. 
 
And so man, created as a personal being in the image of God, is only the raw 
material for a further and more difficult stage of God’s creative work.  This is the 
leading of men as relatively free and autonomous persons, through their own 
dealings with life in the world in which He has placed them, towards that quality 
of personal existence that is the finite likeness of God.  
 
…[O]ne who has attained to goodness by meeting and eventually mastering 
temptations, and thus by rightly making responsible choices in concrete 
situations, is good in a richer and more valuable sense than would one created ab 
initio in a state either of innocence or of virtue.  In the former case, which is that 
of the actual moral achievements of mankind, the individual’s goodness has 
within it the strength of temptation overcome, a stability based upon an 
accumulation of right choices, and a positive and responsible character that 
comes from the investment of costly personal effort. 
 
The crucial quality of the world for this end is not the amount of pleasure the world affords us, 
but ‘its fitness for its primary purpose, the purpose of soul-making’.  The main idea seems to be 
that evil does not serve any hedonistic end, the end being aimed at is the proper development of 
moral personality.  However, this seems to me a clear (although subtle and sophisticated) 
instantiation of G2 above.  God allows evil (or suffering) in order to promote some (admittedly 
non-hedonistic) end such that the end (the moral  
development of humans) outweighs the suffering that is necessary for it, and we as  
humans are thus all the better for the suffering we undergo in the ‘vale of soul-making’. 
IV.  The Christian Tradition and Respect for Persons. 
 The principle G2 above is a fairly obvious example of a consequentialist-type 
justification.  Consequentialism is the view that what makes actions morally right are the 
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consequences of the action; roughly, an action is morally acceptable iff it produces on the whole 
at least as much good (or less evil) as any alternative action available to the agent at that time.  Of 
course, how one defines ‘good’ (and ‘evil’) will determine what kind of consequentialist one is, 
and FTGG theodicists do not provide (across the board) a unified account of the good.  I think the 
most plausible way to take theodicists like Hick would be as a sort of welfare utilitarian (at least 
regarding the justification of evil vis-à-vis God’s omnibenevolence).  The principle here would be 
something like ‘an action is morally acceptable iff it produces at least as much welfare for the 
persons affected by the action (or the least anti-welfare) as any action available to the agent at the 
time’.  So, the resulting picture would be: God legitimately allows certain types of evil in certain 
amounts because allowing those types and amounts of evil produces at least as much welfare (or 
the least anti-welfare) for all persons affected by the action as any other action available to God at 
the time. 
 If the above account is true to the spirit of FTGG theodicies, then it seems as though 
FTGG theodicists open themselves to a common objection to consequentialist thinking.  
Consequentialism by its nature enjoins moral agents to maximize6 some good that is external to 
the moral action itself; in the case of FTGG theodicies, the existence of evil is taken to be 
necessary for the production of some good (the dev lopment of moral sympathy, empathy, the 
moral progress of the individual, the moral progress of humankind, etc.).  However, it has often 
been noted that consequentialism is insensitive to considerations of individual rights and justice.  
That is, as long as no moral agent finds out, individual rights and justice considerations could be 
violated (in some cases, it might be morally required to violate such considerations) as long as an 
appropriate amount of the good in question is produced by such actions.  Consequentialism in its 
                                                            
 
6 Some forms only require us to satisfy some threshold amount of whatever good it is (e.g., pleasure, 
preference satisfaction, welfare, etc.) at which we are supposed to be aimed.  This type of consequentialism 
is usually referred to as a ‘satisficing’ consequentialist theory.  I think my objection to FTGG theodicies 
will tell against either ‘maximizing’ or ‘satisficing’ versions. 
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pure form does not scruple regarding how the good is produced, as long as the good is produced 
in the appropriate amount and outweighs the evil produced. 
 In the case of FTGG-type theodicies, if the greater good to be produced is produced for 
someone other than the one who (must) suffer to p oduce the good, then one who suffers is being 
treated as a means to the production of the good.  For example (and this is a claim that, I think, 
many FTGG theodicists would endorse), if an earthquake in Indonesia resulting in the deaths of 
ten thousand people raises the moral and practical consciousness of the rest of the world (great 
outpourings of support and aid, perhaps improvements in earthquake detection heretofore largely 
ignored, and an overall net worldwide increase in sympathy and empathy), then arguably the 
good produced outweighs the evil suffered by the victims of the earthquake, and thus on FTGG 
theodicy terms, the suffering was justified.  However, one must ask: are not the people who died 
in the quake being used as a means to the producti n of such goods?  Using people as a means to 
some end is to violate respect for the persons being used; that is, to use someone as a means is to 
treat that person not as an autonomous being, but as a thing to be used.  This consideration 
generates, I think, the following argument: 
B: P1)  If one accepts an FTGG theodicy as justificatory for the existence of evil, 
then one  accepts that God allows some evil to exist in order to produce a greater 
good or to  prevent a worse evil. 
P2)  If one accepts that God allows some evil to exist in order to produce a 
greater good or to prevent a worse evil, then one is committed to the view that, 
inevitably, some people will be used (i.e., undergo suffering) by God to produce 
goods for others. 
P3)  If one is committed to the view that, inevitably, some people will be used 
(i.e., undergo suffering) by God to produce goods for others, then one is 
committed to the view that God does not respect (some) persons. 
P4)  From a religious point of view, one should not be committed to the view that 
God does not respect (some) persons. 
∴C)  From a religious point of view, one should not accept an FTGG theodicy as 
justificatory for the existence of evil. 
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In other words, an FTGG theodicy is designed to show that the existence of evil is consistent with 
the existence of an omnibenevolent God.  However, a bedrock of many Christian views of 
morality is the notion of the intrinsic value of the autonomous person.  FTGG theodicies 
undermine this notion by appearing to sanction the using of such persons as mere means to some 
end, and thus should not be acceptable to theists. 
 One twist in argument B above is that God would use someone as a means (and thus not 
respect their personhood) if they were used to produce goods f r others.  On the line of thinking I 
am developing, if God allows A to suffer to produce some good for B (or for people in general), 
then A is being used as a means and thus is not being respected (this is what I tried to capture in 
P2).  However, if God allows A to suffer to produce some good for A herself, then arguably God 
has not used A as a means, but as an end (e.g., God allows A to suffer to teach A something).  
The latter case does not clearly show that A is beng used as a means; the former case, I think, 
does.  If, in the course of evils that we have empirically observed, there have been some cases in 
which a person suffers (say, a sudden and painful death) in a way that does not redound to their 
benefit at all, even if it does produce goods for others, then I would want to say that the sufferer 
has been used as a means only, and thus not respected.  Note that there is no need in the context 
of an FTGG theodicy to wrangle about the amount of evil allowed compared to the amount of 
good produced.  Any amount of evil allowed in such cases would undermine the justification for 
evil offered by FTGG theodicies.  If such cases have happened, then FTGG theodicies seem to 
offer no comfort to the theist. 
 
V.  Possible Replies. 
 1)  One possible reply to argument B is that even on FTGG theodicies, God never simply 
uses someone to promote some good for others, because even those who suffer and die and thus 
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get no benefit themselves in this life will be rewarded in the next life.  So God does respect them 
after all by rewarding their sacrifice, and thus P2 in argument B above is false. 
 However, being rewarded in the afterlife does not seem to make it the case that the 
person was not initially still used as a means.  Suppose that A lies to B so that C benefits.  After 
the fact, A recompenses B for her time and trouble.  While A may have made amends, it still 
remains a fact that A has used B for C’s benefit, and no amount of reward will justify A’s 
treatment of B.  So it seems as though afterlife rewa ds, while nice, will not justify suffering for 
another’s benefit. 
 2)  What about cases in which the sufferer herself benefits, or cases in which there is a 
‘split’ benefit (e.g., the sufferer benefits in some way from suffering which provides benefits for 
perhaps many others)? 
 I would reply that, in cases in which the sufferer benefits as well as others that arguably 
the sufferer has not been used as a mere means, and thus has (possibly) been respected.  However, 
it certainly seems that there have been cases in which the sufferer does not benefit (at least in the 
way many FTGG theodicists would wish to claim) in this life.  In cases in which someone suffers 
and dies without reaping any of the greater goods (i.e., if the sufferer is an infant, or dies quickly 
enough that there is no time for any moral benefit), even if others obtain such goods, I would 
maintain that that person has been used in just the way I specified earlier. 
 3)  One could claim that God has a ‘higher morality’, and thus we cannot judge God’s 
actions in a moral context.  Thus, FTGG theodicies can still be acceptable to theists because we 
simply cannot judge the morality of God’s apparently using people as a mere means from our 
standpoint. 
 From a religious standpoint, if God has a higher morality, then that would seem to leave 
humans in dark about moral law.  It certainly would be odd to claim that what we would normally 
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call ‘bad’ (e.g., treating people as things to be us d rather than as persons) God would call ‘good’.  
At this point, one might wonder what evidence we ould have to call God ‘good’.  I think this 
would be unacceptable to most theists. 
 4)  I think the most promising response might go something like this: when we think of 
God’s using someone we are thinking about the relationship between humans and God in the 
wrong way.  The best way to conceive of the relationship between God and humans is as that of 
parent to child.  Thus, God’s allowing humans to uffer from time to time is analogous to a parent 
allowing a child to make their own mistakes in order to learn; or, God allows us to suffer in order 
to teach us how not to live.  For example, if I see my two-year-old reaching for an electrical 
outlet, I may slap his hand (especially if he is persistent in trying to get to the outlet), thus 
actively causing (some) suffering in order to prevent some greater evil (grievous injury).  He may 
not understand why I did such a thing, and he may even be resentful for a while, but it is I that 
knows best in this case.  Analogously, it is God that knows best; the suffering that God allows 
really does have some reason, although we may well not know what that reason is. 
 I think that this response, if appropriately developed, may eventually lead to a response to 
the criticism of FTGG-type theodicies.  However, any response along these lines will have to 
account for situations in which one suffers in order that another (or humans in general) may 
benefit.  Continuing the above analogy, FTGG theodicies would seem to endorse a situation in 
which I punish my six-year-old in order to improve my two-year-old’s behavior.  To make the 
analogy even more to the point, suppose I punish my six-year-old in such a way as to benefit my 
whole family minus my six-year-old (he doesn’t receive any benefit, although everybody else 
does).  In both of the above cases, even though I may know a lot more about the consequences 
than anyone else in my family, I still seem to have used my six-year-old as a means, and have 
thus wronged him, even if the benefits for the rest of my family are great.  It would be wrong of 
me, no matter how much I know about the consequences and no matter how little my son knows 
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about them, to use him in such a way.  If an FTGG theodicy would sanction such behavior on 
God’s part, then I would say so much the worse for theodicies of that type. 
 5)  Another possible reply could be based on an alternate account of what it means to use 
a person as a means.  On this account, to use someone as a mere means would be to treat them in 
a way to which they would not (or could not) in principle consent.  If A, for example, steals B’s 
property, and B does not or would not consent to being the victim of A’s plans to obtain more 
wealth, then A has used B as a mere means.  If A asks B for some money (and perhaps even 
admits that he cannot pay B back), and B still freely gives A the money, then A has not used B as 
a mere means.  This account yields something like the following principle: 
M 2:  For any person S, S uses person P as a mere means if S treats P in a 
way to which P would not or could not consent. 
 
Note that the ‘consent’ condition is sufficient for treating someone as a mere means, but is not 
necessary. 
 This may generate an objection to my account of FTGG theodicies in the following way.  
One may claim that, when God allows a certain amount of evil to either produce a greater good or 
to prevent a greater evil, even if a person who suffers for the good of others does not consent to 
undergo such suffering (and thus, on my account, is being treated as a mere means), perhaps such 
a person should consent to being treated in such a way.  The ‘should’ in the previous sentence 
could be taken in at least two ways.  First, one could claim that one who suffers for the good of 
others is somehow morally lacking if they would fail to consent to suffer for the good of others.  
Alternatively, one could claim that one who does not consent to suffer for the good of others is 
simply not in an epistemic position to withhold rational consent (presumably ‘rational’ consent 
would require the consenter to possess a certain amount of knowledge of the consequences of 
consent versus the withholding of consent).  The first sense would be the ‘moral’ sense; the 
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second the ‘rational’ sense.  I will, given space considerations, only deal with this objection in the 
moral sense. 
 Holding to the moral sense in the context of FTGG theodicies would yield the something 
like the following principle: 
G2(M):  God treats a person S as an end if God treats S in a way to which S 
should (morally) consent, even if S does not or would not in fact consent. 
 
The insight of this objection is, I think, this: God doesn’t really treat someone as a mere means 
when the person does not actually consent to suffer; the person’s non-consent is actually a moral 
failure on the part of the sufferer herself.  She s ould consent; if she doesn’t, she has shown 
herself to lack certain virtues. 
 What are we to say about this objection?  The point of the objection seems to be that, 
morally speaking, we are required to suffer in order to produce goods for others.  In other words, 
a person is morally obligated to suffer, at least in some cases.  This account seems to blur the 
distinction between obligation and supererogation, and is counter to the intuition that the moral 
requirement of such self-sacrifice is to put too heavy a moral burden on the moral agent.  Further, 
how would this principle fare if universalized?  If it is true that I should (morally) consent to 
suffer in any case in which my suffering would result in the production of greater good or the 
prevention of greater evil, then a theory that embraces this has already given up on respect for the 
individual.  Secondly, if God is omniscient, then God would presumably already know who 
would consent to suffer and who would not.  Totreat someone in a way to which they should 
consent, but actually would not, still does not seem to be respecting that individual as someone 
who is autonomous and responsible for their own decisions. 
 In short, this line of defense amounts to saying that God morally requires self-sacrifice 
for the production of greater good.  However, in a case in which one does not consent to suffer to 
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produce that good, even if it indicates a moral failing on the part of one who does not consent, 
would still not respect the non-consenter.  Further, any theory that requires such self-sacrifice 
seems to have already given up the claim that we ought to respect persons.  I suppose that one 
could argue that we ought to either a) give up the claim that respect for persons is a fundamental 
intuition that any moral theory ought to observe, or b) that God really does hold to a higher 
morality.  Both options are, however, fraught with peril. 
VI.  Conclusion. 
 I have argued that FTGG theodicies are consequentialist in nature, and as such should be 
unacceptable to theists because FTGG theodicies seem to justify the using of persons as mere 
means to the production of some good for others, which seems to undermine the religious notion 
of the value of a person.  If I am right, FTGG theodicies should be unacceptable to theists on 
religious grounds, and thus do not offer the justification for the existence of evil that they claim
